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Cybersecurity policy analytics quantitatively evaluates the effectiveness of cybersecurity protection measures 
consisting of both technical and managerial countermeasures and is inherently interdisciplinary work, drawing 
on the concepts and methods from economics, business, social science, and law. 
 
 
The battle between cybersecurity protection and perpetration will never be settled on account of human 
beings’ intrinsic motivation for interconnection in modern society. First, information technology-enabled 
interconnections bridge the existing system and network boundaries across countries, organizations, and 
people. The rapid penetration of interconnection results in ever-emerging vulnerabilities embedded in the 
creation of new technologies and new uses of existing technologies. Second, cybersecurity threats are a by-
product of freedom and prosperity empowered by digital transformation, as they manifest themselves in the 
routine activities of everyday life. The extensive digital presence within social activities and personal assets 
substantially increases the opportunity of the convergence of suitable targets and motivated perpetrators in 
space and time. Third, the dual-use nature of cybersecurity technology further catalyzes the arms race between 
techniques adopted for civilian and commercial purposes and techniques exploited for security violation,1 
with examples found in the evolution of technologies for cryptography, remote access control, and resilience 
testing. The social, economic, and technological roots of cybersecurity determine that effective national 
cybersecurity policies are as important as technical countermeasures in tackling cybersecurity threats. 
Cybersecurity policy analytics contributes to improving the effectiveness of cybersecurity policies by 
identifying the relevant mechanisms and deriving the business and policy implications underlying the 
emerging risks associated with advanced technologies. One of the key issues in conducting cybersecurity 
policy analytics is the availability of panel data to support a causal inference that relates the precursors and 
drivers of observable outcomes through various kinds of processes. In this article, we first discuss three 
critical empirical inquiries arising from challenges to the effectiveness of cybersecurity policies. Then we 
introduce how multiple-sourced data sets have been found and integrated to support quantitative 
measurements and causal inferences in initial efforts, which attempt to answer the three critical inquiries. The 
results we report are based on two types of empirical studies:  
■ We use backscatter data to address the deterrence challenges of law enforcement against cybercrimes. We 
make use of visible and identifiable backscatter traffic on the public-peering infrastructure of the Internet.  
■ We use online hacker forums on the surface web. These types of data are used to analyze the censorship 
dilemma related to public online hacker forums and consider the benefits of law enforcement shutting down 
such forums versus allowing them to operate in the open. They serve as a suitable means for sharing the 
knowledge and tools used for protecting against cyberattacks, or perhaps in the opposite direction, for 
committing cyberattacks.  
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We further propose the potential of using Internet routing data to address the interdependence of cybersecurity 
across national or organizational boundaries. Finally, we discuss the future directions and challenges involved 
in cybersecurity policy analytics research. 
 
Three Critical Empirical Inquiries Related to the Effectiveness of Cybersecurity Policies  
Similar to conventional crimes, a national government can address cybercrimes from the perspectives of 
perpetrators, victims, and intermediaries.1 The first-party strategy aims to deter cybercriminals through either 
legal or cost deterrence. Legal deterrence imposes sanction costs ex-post offenses. Cost deterrence 
criminalizes computer misuse acts (CMAs) ex-ante offenses (e.g., the production, distribution, and possession 
of computer misuse tools with offensive intent) to raise the barrier to acquiring the techniques and tools used 
for committing cyberattacks. The second-party strategy facilitates user precaution by subsidizing 
cybersecurity investment and promoting cybersecurity information sharing and emergency response. The 
third-party strategy leverages the power of intermediaries by imposing secondary liability upon them or 
motivating their provisioning of cybersecurity services. The intermediaries include a broad range of Internet 
service providers, cloud service providers, software vendors, and hardware manufacturers that supply the 
infrastructures and platforms used for interconnection and digitization.  
Both private- and public-sector organizations are more actively seeking help from their respective national 
government authorities to reduce incoming cybersecurity threats and facilitate cross-border coordination for 
threat monitoring, detection, and resolution. However, the effectiveness of government measures is subject to 
the challenge of the unique characteristics of cybercrimes, mainly from the three following aspects.  
First, cybersecurity perpetrators use cost-effective means that are empowered by cheap computing power and 
ubiquitous Internet connections. The remoteness, invisibility, and anonymity pertaining to cyberattacks further 
increases the cost of monitoring and investigating offenses, which, in turn, reduces the success rate of 
enforcement.1 Such concerns about the difficulty of deterrence lead to an empirical inquiry about the 
deterrence effect of law enforcement against cybercriminals. Second, the dual-use nature of cybersecurity 
technology implies that, to develop a defensive capability against cyberattacks, there needs to be a deep 
understanding of an adversary’s technology and mindset. Thus, criminalizing the production, distribution, and 
possession of computer misuse tools with offensive intent may deter the provision of hacking techniques 
intended for cybersecurity violation and, at the same time, generate the unintended effect of discouraging 
information sharing about similar techniques and vulnerabilities for civilian purposes. Consequently, the cost 
of deterrence on cybercriminals leads to an empirical inquiry about the net effect of the communication of 
hacking techniques on cybersecurity threats and the extent of overdeterrence on legitimate cybersecurity 
professionals.  
Finally, the cybersecurity of any individual entity in an interconnected system depends not only on its own 
effort but on the efforts exerted by other entities in the same system and the infrastructure or platform related 
to them. The positive externalities of cybersecurity investment across interconnected users and organizations 
indulge cybernegligence, while the negative externalities of cybersecurity risks among them dampen the 
private interests for cybersecurity precaution. The interdependent risks, together with interweaving 
infrastructures and systems, render the efforts of any individual entity (either individual or organization) in 
cybersecurity prevention technically and economically inefficient.2 Hence, to evaluate the impact of any 
cybersecurity policy, we must take into account the interactions among the entities in the cybersecurity 
ecosystem. This, in turn, leads to an empirical inquiry on the quantitative measurement of the evolution of the 
infrastructure and/or platforms that are underpinning the interconnected business and social activities, which 
have been missing in previous empirical studies due to data unavailability. In the following sections, we 
introduce the initial efforts that address the aforementioned three critical empirical inquires via publicly 
accessible information on the Internet.  
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Difficulty of Deterrence  
The main purpose of crime legislation and enforcement is to deter potential criminals via criminalization and 
punishment. Deterrence through legislation and enforcement has been challenging in the realms of cybercrime 
because perpetrators can utilize the remoteness, invisibility, and anonymity of online activities and leverage 
their cost advantages when committing cyberattacks. By spoofing their source IP addresses, controlling 
remotely located compromised computers, or additionally turning remote computers into attacking botnets, 
attackers can anonymously conduct malicious activities and victimize computer systems all over the world. 
Tracing back to the original attackers often requires collaboration between organizations and countries to use 
preserved stored computer data and network traffic data for forensic analysis. Dual criminality and extradition 
treaties are additional requirements to prosecute and convict international suspects. Because of all these 
difficulties in unambiguously pinpointing the perpetrator and in implementing cross-border enforcement, the 
extent of the deterrence effect of cybercrime legislation has long been questioned.1  
Moreover, attackers can undermine or thwart legal investigations and enforcement by switching targets, 
restructuring attack paths, and relocating the attacking resources for the purposes of avoiding detection and 
maximizing criminal returns. Hence, imposing penalties on the commission of cybercrimes may sometimes 
lead to criminals changing their behavior in ways that cause unexpected, negative results. According to the 
theory of marginal deterrence,3 law enforcement may divert perpetrators to other victims with a higher profit 
margin or to jurisdictions with weaker enforcement. Perpetrators may even vary the frequency and severity of 
attacks to render the monitoring and investigation costs associated with enforcement too costly to proceed. In 
this article, we introduce three studies that address the deterrence effects of law enforcement from the 
following research questions:  
■ Does domestic enforcement deter cyberattacks?4  
■ Does international legislation deter cyberattacks?5  
■ Does international legislation lead to marginal deterrence, or does it fail in this respect?6  
In these studies, the data assembled on cyberattacks have been linked with assembled data from global news 
sources on cybercrime enforcement and with compiled data on country-specific cybercrime legislation and 
international cybercrime treaty agreements. For international treaty legislation, the focus was placed on the 
Convention on Cybercrime [(COC); Europe Treaty Series No. 185], which was the first international 
legislation against cybercrime and has 55 allied member states as of April 2020. 
 
Cyberattack Data  
To measure the cyberattack rate and its severity, these studies obtained the backscatter data that was sent by 
distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack victims and made available by the Center for Applied Internet 
Data Analysis [(CAIDA) 2005–2019] and the Internet Storm Center (2004–present). The backscatter traffic 
manifests itself in terms of visible and identifiable traffic on the public-peering infrastructure of the Internet. It 
is the cyberattack data set that has the longest monitoring and reporting history (since 2000 to the present for 
DShield data) and the broadest coverage (with victims geographically located in more than 200 countries). 
Both data sources have worldwide coverage with detailed attack information. By tracking the backscatter 
packets and their origins, it was possible to analyze the change in DDOS attack victims and in the severity of 
attacks at a granular level over time and across organizations. 
 
Enforcement and Legislation Data  
To identify any government enforcement actions against cyberattackers, Png et al.4 searched the contents of 
Factiva, a subscription database owned by Dow Jones & Company, Inc., a subsidiary of News Corporation, 
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which provides access to 33,000 global news sources including licensed publications and influential websites 
and blogs, images, and videos. Keywords related to hacking, conviction, jail sentence, and prosecution in the 
official language for each country were used to search the Factiva database.  
Various international organizations maintain country profiles on cybersecurity development and cybercrime 
legislation. For example, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) publishes a cyberwellness profile 
that provides an overview of a country’s cybersecurity development, including its legal measures. However, 
as the ITU acknowledges, “No single publication can adequately cover all aspects in depth.” Accordingly, Hui 
et al.5 have compiled lists of cybercrime domestic legislation in each country from multiple sources, including 
information from the Asian School of Cyber Laws, the Council of Europe, the ITU, and the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime. Once relevant domestic legislation was identified, they conducted further search 
via the Internet to locate—to the extent possible—more detailed information on each country’s legislation, 
including details on dates of entry into force and changes in legislative content or items.  
To investigate the causal effects of law enforcement on cyberattacks, the event study methodology originally 
used in financial economics and the difference-indifference methodology founded in quantitative social 
science research have been adapted to identify the change on cyberattack rates as a direct result of government 
legislation and enforcement, relative to the countries and/or the time periods without enforcement. In 
particular, the autonomous system (AS)-level peering partnership across country borders has been used to 
measure interdependence in terms of Internet traffic. An AS is one of the most important components of 
Internet infrastructure. Referring to Request for Comments 1930, “An AS is a connected group of routers run 
by one or more network operators, which has a single and clearly defined routing policy.” The AS relationship 
data are provided by CAIDA on a monthly basis. The utilization of AS-level peering data empowers Hui et 
al.5 to identify the reinforcement effect and displacement effect of the COC resulted from the Internet traffic 
interdependence across ASs originating from different countries.  
Figure 1(a) and (b) illustrates the reinforcement effect of the COC. A hacker’s real geolocation is AS1 in 
country A and targets victims’ infrastructure within AS4 and geolocated in country D. AS2 and AS3, 
geolocated in countries B and C, respectively, are AS4’s Internet peering partners who transit data traffic 
originating from or delivered to AS4. Hackers remotely control the zombie networks in AS2 and AS3 to 
commit DDOS attacks targeting victims in AS4. Figure 1(a) shows that if country C is a non-COC country, a 
hacker can always conceal their real location by conveying a DDOS attack via the zombie networks within 
AS3 geolocated in country C, given countries A, B, and D are all COC countries. As country C is not a COC 
country, it has no obligation to provide the necessary resources and information to facilitate COC countries in 
cybercrime investigation, which makes the hacker’s attack path untraceable. Figure 1(b) shows that when all 
of AS4’s Internet peering partners, AS2 and AS3, are geolocated in COC countries, all the attack paths 
targeting AS4 are trackable, which increases the hacker’s prosecution risk and results in a deterrence effect 
against hackers.  
Figure 2 illustrates the displacement effect of the COC. Under the same situation as in Figure 1(a), where only 
country C is a non-COC country, hackers may relocate their zombie networks from AS3 in country C to AS4 
in country D and substitute the original victim in AS4 with a new victim in AS3. Because AS3 is geolocated 
in a non-COC country, the law enforcement agency in country C is unable to acquire the necessary 
information from either country B or D to trace back the hackers’ real location. Hence, the DDOS attacks 
targeting victims in AS3 may increase as all of its Internet peering partners except AS3 itself are geolocated in 
COC countries. These studies provide insight into the deterrence effects of law enforcement from three 
aspects. 
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Domestic Enforcement  
They found limited evidence that domestic enforcement deters attacks within the country; however, they 
found compelling evidence of a displacement effect: as the enforcement of U.S. cybersecurity laws 
strengthened, more attacks were originated from overseas locations.4  
 
International Legislation  
They found evidence of successful deterrence by the international COC legislation. The number of IP 
addresses victimized by DDOS attacks decreased by at least 11.8% in the enforcing countries. This deterrence 
effect did not exist, however, when the enforcing countries were not fully abiding by all the requirements of 
the treaty. In other words, in those countries that were abiding by the treaty to only a limited extent, the 
decline in the number of cyberattacks was a smaller percentage decrease or was nonexistent. These studies 
also found evidence of network and displacement effects. The enforcement was particularly effective when 
other countries also fully enforced the COC. At the same time, this may result in cyberattacks being displaced 
to other countries not participating in the treaty or to those not fully abiding by it.5 
 
Marginal Deterrence  
They found that, although the number of IP addresses victimized by DDOS attacks tended to decrease in the 
new COC countries, the severity of the attacks, as measured by the maximum number of bits per second 
targeting each IP address, systematically increased in these countries. This finding suggests that although the 
COC could deter minor attackers, determined attackers may pursue more serious attacks given the expected 
penalty. Hence the failure of marginal deterrence does exist in cybercrime enforcement.6 
Future research on the law enforcement of cybersecurity offenses may extend in two directions. The first 
direction is to study the strategic responses between organizations and attackers by leveraging the 
organizational level backscatter traffic and the Internet peering data on a daily or even hourly basis. This 
requires extra efforts to link IP addresses or AS numbers with their affiliated organizations, and further, to 
integrate with business databases widely available for listed companies, venture capital funds, or intellectual 
properties. Such an interdisciplinary integration of data on cyberattacks and of Internet peering and business 
data sets using public IP addresses or AS numbers as the linkage, may generate innovative and insightful 
business and policy implications for cybersecurity management. 
The other direction is to study the impacts of law enforcement on other types of cyberattacks with distinct 
technical mechanisms compared to DDOS attacks. For example, looking at publicly accessible large-scale 
cyberincident data feeds on spam emission and phishing website hosting. The available data sources include 
Composite Blocking List, Passive Spam Block List, and many other Domain Name System-based blackhole 
lists of suspected email spam sending computer infections. Free phishing feeds are also available in 
OpenPhish, a fully automated self-contained platform that collects and analyzes millions of unfiltered uniform 
resource locators from a variety of sources on its global partner network. As different cyberattacks involve 
different cost structures on the perpetrator side and cause different levels of harm on the victim side, an 
empirical investigation on deterrence effects in various cybersecurity risk contexts could help policy makers 
understand the economic incentives behind user precaution and criminal offenses. 
 
The Dual-Use Nature of Cybersecurity Technology  
It is clear and broadly acknowledged by (most) governments, companies, and individuals that malicious 
attacks that intentionally disable or degrade networks or steal someone’s personal information are wrong and 
constitute a criminal act. But what about the publicly accessible online discussion of hacking knowledge? Is it 
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wrong to allow such forums to exist in the open? Should discussing hacking knowledge in publicly accessible 
online forums be considered the production, distribution, and possession of computer misuse tools with 
offensive intent and thus subject to the enforcement of a country’s CMA? This is not a clear-cut judgment 
because of the “dual-use” characteristic of these hacking forums.1 The know-how generated and explained in 
these forums can be used for both malicious purposes (how to launch attacks) as well as for beneficial 
purposes (how to defend against or respond to attacks). 
Both sides of this argument have been put forth. On the negative side, it has been noted that online hacker 
forums expose more people to hacking and hence promote aggression and copycat criminal behavior, and may 
also encourage like-minded hackers to collaborate on attacking other people. On the positive side, some have 
suggested that the discussions in online hacking forums help those looking for ways to protect against or 
respond to ongoing cyberattacks to acquire the necessary detailed knowledge for protecting themselves or for 
taking countermeasures to respond more quickly. Another observation is that more open discussion of hacking 
removes its novelty, which is arguably a major motivator for many “script kiddies.” More open availability of 
hacker knowledge may contribute to establishing stronger and better social norms, which is one way to curb 
cybercrimes.1 In the context of these contradictory influences, two focal questions have been examined 
relative to whether or not publicly accessible online hacker forums should be censored: 
■ What is the net impact of hacking discussions in online hacker forums on cyberattacks?7  
■ How does the banning of such hacking discussions in public online forums influence knowledge sharing of 
cyberprotection knowledge?8 
The two questions are related to one another: if the net impact of hacking discussions on cyberattacks is 
insignificant or even negative, allowing hacking discussions in public online forums should not increase 
cyberattacks. On the contrary, banning hacking discussions would reduce the exposure of hacking techniques 
to the public, thereby also eliminating access for law-abiding forum readers to an important source of 
information on how to protect against such attacks. Unlike malicious and criminal attackers, law-abiding IT 
and cybersecurity specialists are less likely to acquire hacking techniques via private channels or underground 
markets. Thus, the public’s cybersecurity awareness and protection capability may even decrease if 
protection-oriented techniques and alerts are not easy to access. 
 
Hacking Technique-Sharing Data  
In contrast to underground hacker communication channels (i.e., an instant-messaging system), hacker forums 
on the surface web are publicly accessible communities in which a vast amount of user-generated content can 
be retrieved on a longitudinal basis. These forums differ from the hacker communities on the darknet where 
participation is by invitation only and most of those invited are black hats who intend to engage in illicit 
trading. Although publicly accessible forums may not capture the most malicious activities in hacker 
communities compared to what is happening on the darknet, they are more likely to attract less determined 
hackers or the curious because of relatively easy entry and low legal risk. Publicly accessible hacker forums 
represent important cybersecurity forces with the potential to convert hacking techniques into defensive 
measures as well as the potential to join professional hackers in committing cybercrimes. Indeed, publicly 
accessible hacker forums are vantage points from which we can observe the variety of discussions on 
cybersecurity techniques. These discussions display a spectrum of intent ranging from offensive to neutral to 
defensive, which provides an ideal setting for investigating the emergence of various interests on hacking 
techniques and the impacts of national cybersecurity policies on them. 
Six well-known and representative hacker forums in English, Chinese, and Russian were selected for content 
analysis with a focus on cybersecurity techniques. Latent Dirichlet allocation models, various supervised 
learning models, and manual classification were used to classify millions of hacker forum posts comprising a 
mixture of programming scripts as well as unstructured and casual textual discussions.7 
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Among various hacking techniques, DDOS attack techniques are chosen because of the availability of real-
world attack data and their association with specific port numbers. The discussion of DDOS attacks within the 
six hacker forums was linked to real-world DDOS attacks via the Transmission Control Protocol/ User 
Datagram Protocol (TCP/UDP) port numbers specifically mentioned in the hacker forum discussion that 
featured DDOS attack-related keywords. These linkages were used to investigate the empirical relationships 
between online hacking forum discussion and real-world cyberattacks, including rigorous statistical modeling 
to test for causality (aside from correlation). 
Chinese online hacker forums were used to investigate the second research question mentioned previously. 
The Chinese government enacted Amendment VII of the People’s Republic of China Criminal Law on 28 
February 2009. The amended Article 285 of Section 3 (we refer to Article 285) criminalizes the production, 
distribution, and possession of computer misuse tools. It states that “Whosoever provides programs and tools 
specifically for the purpose of intruding into and illegally controlling computer information systems or 
provide others with programs and tools, knowing full well that those persons commit illegal and criminal acts 
of intruding into and controlling computer information systems, where the circumstances are grave, shall be 
punished for fixed-term imprisonment of between three to seven years.” According to Article 285, the 
discussion of malicious attack techniques is subject to enforcement. Following the enforcement of this 
amendment, forum administrators were required to remove posts containing hacking techniques and to impose 
surveillance on user-generated content. The impact of the enforcement of this CMA was addressed by 
comparing forum users’ knowledge contribution before and after the CMA, with the control of confounding 
effects from group size and online community competition. Figure 3 shows the conversion of users’ online 
discussion topics from cybersecurity-related topics (e.g., a protection- or hacking-oriented discussion, or a 
neutral discussion on security techniques without specifying a use for either protection or offense) to 
cybersecurity-irrelevant topics following the CMA enforcement. 
 
Research based on the aforementioned hacker forums shows that the discussion of DDOS attacks in online 
hacker forums was associated with a decrease in the number of DDOS attack victims. The mention of botnets, 
especially new botnets, was initially correlated with an increase in attacks, but the follow-up discussion was 
mildly correlated with a decrease in attacks. Hence, the discussion in online hacking forums does appear to 
have the dual-use characteristic noted previously, and as such, the effect of having these types of publicly 
available forums has both negative and positive aspects.7 
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Enforcement against the production, distribution, and possession of computer misuse tools tended to increase 
forum contributions on protection-oriented discussions. However, this contribution was mainly provided by 
users who had originally focused on hacking-oriented discussions as their risk of discussing hacking 
techniques increased following the enforcement. On the other hand, this enforcement discouraged those 
contributors who had originally actively contributed to the protection-oriented discussions. This is probably 
because users’ perceived value of protection-oriented discussion increases with their perceived threats from 
malicious activities. With less discussion of hacking techniques, the forum participants may end up being less 
aware of the prevalent malicious activities related to cyberattacks. As a result, their interest in protection-
oriented discussions also decreases.8 
These findings support previously published work that noted that these forums have a dual-use characteristic. 
As such, although the presence of these online hacker forums is problematic in some ways, banning them 
makes it more difficult, and therefore more costly, for white hats and legitimate users to be alerted to and 
informed about up-to-date cybersecurity threats and hacking techniques. Banning these forums also pushes 
black hats and gray hats to underground communities, which are full of illegal transactions and more difficult 
for legal monitoring and investigation. The existence of these online hacker forums is a double-edged sword 
for cybersecurity threat reduction and for national cybersecurity policies. Future research in this direction can 
be extended to various forms of online hacker communities including forums, blogs, and other types of user-
generated content. Other than keyword-based feature engineering, advanced natural language processing 
should be applied here to extract context- and structure-related information based on specific domain 
knowledge on cybersecurity, information sharing, and social networking. This type of in-depth data 
preprocessing and coding is the prerequisite to conducting data analytics toward insights with mechanisms 
rooted in theories of economics, law, and social sciences. Such an interdisciplinary integration of data sources, 
methodologies, and theories may contribute to the knowledge of social, economic, cultural, and psychological 
forces in the intertwined evolution of constructive and destructive cybertechnologies. 
 
The Measurement of Cybersecurity Interdependence  
With Respect to Internet Infrastructure The Internet infrastructure is the physical foundation of digitalization 
and the most important infrastructure and platform underpinning modern society’s interconnected business 
and social activities. The deeply interconnected nature of network infrastructure and the frequency of deep 
linkages between hardware and software components contribute to system interdependencies that are not 
always easily observable and further complicate the assessment of and response to cybersecurity risk.9  
However, cybersecurity interdependence and its role in the policy implementation of interconnected 
organizations have seldom been empirically addressed in the field of information systems (IS), which focuses 
on research about designing, implementing, and managing information technology. We reviewed 
cybersecurity-related articles published in the top-ranked IS journals and conferences from 2004 to 2019, 
focusing on identifying the data sets that IS scholars have utilized in their security research. Examples of 
journals we reviewed are Information Systems Research, Management Information Systems Quarterly, 
Journal of Management Information Systems, and Journal of the Association of Information Systems. The 
conference articles we reviewed were from the International Conference on Information Systems and the 
Workshop on the Economics of Information Security. Our review showed that no Internet infrastructure-
related database has been used by researchers publishing in IS literature to address security issues or to 
measure the underlying nature and degree of organizational interdependence from a network connectivity 
point of view. 
The lack of research in the management and policy-oriented IS community on Internet infrastructure and the 
related network connectivity and interdependence may be attributed to the invisibility of Internet 
infrastructure to most end users due to modularization and encapsulation in the layered computing system 
design. Following up on the work of Hui et al.,5 IS researchers have started to utilize global Border Gateway 
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Protocol (BGP) routing data to quantify and measure the interorganizational relationships associated with 
selected cybersecurity incidences.5 BGP routing data consist of millions of feasible routing paths for Internet 
peering from one AS to another AS. This type of information also includes the rules that routers can read and 
follow when transiting data traffic from one node of the Internet to another on an almost real-time basis 
covering most of the publicly available AS numbers and IP prefixes for nearly three decades since the early 
1990s [e.g., RouteViews' BGP RIBs (Routing Information Bases), which originated in 1995, is one of the 
well-established databases used for BGP routing]. 
Internet peering relationships and their associated Internet traffic exchange are, in essence, a specific way to 
identify and measure business relationships between organizations. These peering relationships capture 
interdependence in Internet infrastructure, which underpins the interconnected networks and systems. Thus, 
we think BGP routing data are one of the richest data sources publicly available to measure cybersecurity 
interdependence with respect to Internet infrastructure. 
In a recent research effort, we quantify the topological characteristics of ASs and their interdependency in 
Internet traffic.11 The period of provision that we considered ranges from the year 2006 to 2019 on a daily 
and per-AS-basis level. We develop an AS connectivity index created from the RouteView data for the 
measurement of AS abnormality, maliciousness level, and the Internet traffic interdependence between ASs. 
We are able to identify the countries or organizations that may unintendedly become the critical Internet 
traffic intermediary of another organization. An organization can choose partners with whom to transit or 
exchange its Internet traffic but cannot control how those partners connect to the rest of the Internet. This 
constrained business liability may result in unintended interdependence in Internet traffic. Thus, we think that 
newly generated data sets at the Internet infrastructure level can provide an important step toward the 
comprehensive measurement of cybersecurity interdependence at different layers of computer network 
architecture across countries or organizations. 
The studies discussed in this article demonstrate that cybersecurity policy analytics can be done using publicly 
available Internet information. Obviously, the quality, specificity, and relevance of this policy analytics work 
are dependent on the types and amounts of information that is publicly available to those doing this type of 
cybersecurity policy work. The pooling of information on cybersecurity incidents contributed by worldwide 
volunteers provides opportunities to quantify more precisely the differential impacts of government 
regulations and online activities on real-world cyberattacks. At the same time, the quality and scope of 
information sharing on threat detection and emergency response have been hampered over the years from 
insufficient incentives to share this type of information among various participants. This has limited the 
precision and extent of efforts to date to measure the impacts of cybersecurity legislation on deterring 
cyberattacks. 
We believe that it is crucial to design effective incentive-compatible mechanisms for cybersecurity-related 
information sharing among organizations by taking into consideration the unique setting of the cybersecurity 
ecosystem. A higher level of contribution of private organization information on cybersecurity incidents 
would tremendously benefit the types of cybersecurity policy analytics described in this article. As such, we 
need to search for incentives for private organizations to make selected aspects of their information available 
on cybersecurity incidents. 
Some promising cases of cybersecurity information sharing have proven successful in the areas of 
healthcare12 and Internet infrastructure.13 Health-care institutions that join health information exchange 
(HIE) programs in the United States are obligated to disclose their data breach incidents, which, in turn, 
motivates these HIE participants to implement strong information technology governance to reduce data 
breach risks. Internet or network service providers that connect to Internet exchange points (IXPs) have to 
share and update their real-time network traffic and routing information among IXP participants to enable and 
benefit from public peering, which, in turn, enhances IXP participants’ capabilities for monitoring and 
detecting the malicious traffic exchanged between their Internet peering partners. 
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As proposed by Wang and Geng,13 in both cases, cybersecurity-related information sharing is not initiated by 
the needs of cybersecurity itself but by the intrinsic need for business efficiency. It is indeed the business-
driven interest that connects information sharing—a means—and specific cybersecurity goals. This 
connection, featured with specificity, makes cybersecurity information sharing incentive compatible and 
operationalizable. Because specific cybersecurity information sharing is based on mutual benefits, it further 
improves the trustworthiness of the data shared among participants. As such, we suggest that cybersecurity 
information sharing among private organizations should be initiated, specified, and implemented according to 
participants’ core business values. 
The success of cybersecurity information sharing also relies on enhanced, international collaborative and 
coordinated efforts to collect and process the huge volume of publicly accessible cybersecurity-related 
information available through the Internet.14 This includes information on vulnerabilities, alerts, and attacks 
as well as the related forum posts and discussions. Much of this type of information is text based, and each 
item provides a tiny fragment and localized piece of a much larger and globally integrated puzzle on the status 
of cybersecurity issues and incidents. Collecting and integrating all of these separate and localized information 
fragments and transforming them into systematically organized, unified, and quantified data sets greatly 
expands opportunities to measure and analyze the evolution of cybersecurity vulnerabilities, the 
interdependency of cybersecurity risks, and the emergency responses to cybersecurity incidents on a global 
scale. 
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